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Abstract In wireless sensor networks, data aggregation al-
lows in-network processing, which leads to reduced packet
transmissions and reduced redundancy, and thus is helpful to
prolong the overall lifetime of wireless sensor networks. In
current studies, Elliptic Curve ElGamal homomorphic encryp-
tion algorithm has been widely used to protect end-to-end data
confidentiality. However, these works suffer from the expen-
sive mapping function during decryption. If the aggregated
results are huge, the base station has no way to gain the orig-
inal data due to the hardness of the elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem. Therefore, these schemes are unsuitable
for the large-scale WSNs. In this paper, we propose a secure
energy-saving data aggregation scheme designed for the
large-scale WSNs. We employ Okamoto-Uchiyama homo-
morphic encryption algorithm to protect end-to-end data con-
fidentiality, use MAC to achieve in-network false data filter-
ing, and utilize the homomorphic MAC algorithm to achieve
end-to-end data integrity. Two popular IEEE 802.15.4-com-
pliant wireless sensor network platforms, Tmote Sky and
iMote 2 have been used to evaluate the efficiency and feasi-
bility of our scheme. The results demonstrate that our scheme
achieved better performance in reducing energy consumption.
Moreover, system delay, especially decryption delay at the
base station, has been reduced when compared to other
state-of-art methods.
Keywords Data aggregation . Confidentiality . Integrity .
Homomorphic encryption . Large-scale wireless sensor
networks
1 Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have attracted a great deal
of research attention due to their wide-range of potential ap-
plications, such as environmental monitoring, health care,
wildlife surveillance, accident report, etc. [1, 2]. Recently,
advances in microprocessor and wireless communication
technologies have enabled the deployment of large-scale
WSNs to obtain fine-grained, high-precision sensing data
[3]. WSNs consist of large numbers of sensor nodes
constrained in storage space, battery power, and computation-
al capability. Therefore, reducing energy consumption is a
critical concern for WSNs.
Data aggregation allows in-network processing, which
leads to fewer packet transmissions and reduces redundancy
and thus is of benefit for prolonging the overall lifetime of
WSNs [4]. With such technique, data sensed by multiple
member nodes are aggregated into a single one by applying
some aggregation functions such as Sum, Average, MAX, etc.
and finally transmitted to the base station via the wireless link.
Apparently, communication overhead is lessened since only
the aggregated result is transmitted to the base station. Thus,
data aggregation is beneficial to increase the WSN’s overall
lifetime.
However, due to the hostile and unattended environments
deployed, WSNs are subject to various attacks, such as replay
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attacks, injection attacks, tampering attacks and so on. As the
sensor nodes in the WSNs are limited in resources, this makes
existing abundant security algorithms unsuitable for resource-
constrained WSNs. Therefore, ensuring security for data ag-
gregation is a challenge.
To guarantee secure data aggregation, numerous
schemes are proposed successively. The authors of [5] pro-
posed two recoverable concealed data aggregation (CDA)
schemes, RCDA-HOMO for homogeneous WSNs and
RCDA-HETE for heterogeneous WSNs. In [6], the authors
proposed a CDAMA scheme for multi-application envi-
ronments, in which ciphertexts from different applications
can be aggregated into a single one and the base station can
extract application-specific data from aggregated cipher-
texts by a corresponding key. Unfortunately, this scheme
is not suitable for the WSNs where the number of clusters
or applications is large. What is more, it does not achieve
data integrity protection. Shim et al. [7] proposed a data
aggregation scheme with confidentiality and integrity,
which provides in-network data filtering and authorized
aggregation.
These above secure data aggregation schemes use Elliptic
Curve ElGamal (EC-EG) homomorphic encryption algorithm
to achieve end-to-end data confidentiality, which makes them
suffer from an expensive mapping function during decryption
and become too costly to revert. If the aggregated results are
large, the base station has no way to gain the original data due
to the hardness of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem
(ECDLP). Therefore, these schemes are unsuitable for the
large-scale WSNs.
Recently, Boudia et al. [4] proposed a novel secure aggre-
gation scheme which uses a symmetric based homomorphic
encryption technique to provide end-to-end data confidential-
ity. However, to achieve data integrity protection, the mes-
sages require to be formed as concatenations of all messages
frommember nodes, i.e.m =m1∣∣… ∣∣mn. Thus, the size of
the resulting message grows linearly with the number of mem-
ber nodes or cluster heads. Therefore, their recoverable sens-
ing data approach is very inefficient if the message size is
large.
To solve the above problems, we design a secure data ag-
gregation scheme that is suitable for large-scale wireless sen-
sor networks but still reduces the energy consumption. We
employ Okamoto-Uchiyama (OU) homomorphic encryption
algorithm to protect end-to-end data confidentiality, use MAC
to achieve in-network false data filtering, and utilize the ho-
momorphic MAC (H-MAC) algorithm to achieve end-to-end
data integrity. Our contributions can be summarized as
follows:
1. We correct some errors discovered in [8]; we amend the
security flaw found in [9] and strengthen security for the
usage of the H-MAC algorithm.
2. We propose a secure data aggregation scheme suitable for
the large-scale WSNs. In previous schemes, decryption
efficiency is not high due to the hardness of ECDLP and
even the base station has no way to decrypt ciphertexts if
the aggregated results are large, which easily makes the
system paralyzed since the base station is busy in
decrypting messages. Fortunately, our scheme makes it
possible for the base station to quickly decrypt ciphertexts
and obtain the sensing data even though the aggregated
results are very large.
3. End-to-end data confidentiality and integrity are provided
using the OU homomorphic encryption algorithm and the
H-MAC scheme, respectively.MAC is used to achieve in-
network false data filtering and thus avoid wasting unnec-
essary energy by not transmitting false data. Analysis
shows that our scheme has a good behavior in reducing
energy consumption. Also, delay, especially decryption
delay at the base station is shorter when compared to other
state-of-art methods.
4. The efficiency and feasibility of our scheme have been
evaluated based on its deployment on Tmote Sky and
iMote 2. The performance of the proposed scheme has
been compared with other related schemes in terms of
computation overhead, communication overhead, energy
consumption and system delay.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews the related works. Section 3 introduces some algo-
rithms mentioned and other related cryptographic tools.
Section 4 comments on Bconfidentiality and integrity for data
aggregation in WSN using homomorphic encryption^.
Section 5 comments on Bsymmetric-key based homomorphic
primitives for end-to-end secure data aggregation in wireless
sensor networks^. Section 6 presents the system model.
Section 7 describes the construction of our scheme in detail.
Section 8 presents security analysis. Performance analysis is
given in section 9 and section 10 concludes this paper.
2 Related works
As a vital method of data collection, data aggregation has
received widespread attention. To achieve secure data aggre-
gation, numerous data aggregation schemes have been widely
proposed.
In conventional hop-by-hop aggregation schemes [10, 11],
an aggregator has to decrypt each received message, then ag-
gregate all messages according to a corresponding aggrega-
tion function and, finally, encrypt the aggregated result before
forwarding to next hop. This means that aggregators are re-
quired to store keys for decryption and, thus, a compromised
aggregator can reveal transmitting messages or forge aggre-
gated results. To decrease this impact, homomorphic
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encryption schemes have been applied to WSNs [12–14]. By
homomorphic encryption schemes, end-to-end data confiden-
tiality is provided. In end-to-end data aggregation schemes,
aggregators directly aggregate encrypted data without
decrypting them and, therefore, compromised aggregators
cannot access secret information.
Girao et al. [15] introduced the method of aggregating
encrypted data in WSNs. They proposed a CDA scheme
based on symmetric homomorphic encryption to achieve the
aggregation of encrypted data. However, all nodes in the work
share a common key for encryption, which means that the
system security will collapse if a node is compromised. The
problem is solved by generating a temporal key for each com-
munication in [16], the authors of which proposed a CDA
scheme based on one-time pad. However, this scheme re-
quires that identifiers of all participants are sent to ensure
accuracy of the aggregated results, which increases the trans-
mission overhead. The authors of [17] proposed an approach
to avoid identifiers transmission; the algorithm requires that
all nodes respond to the query from the base station and values
of nodes having no sensed data are set to zero.
Parmar et al. [9] proposed an integrity and privacy preserv-
ing end-to-end secure data aggregation protocol, in which a
symmetric homomorphic encryption algorithm is used to pro-
tect data confidentiality, MAC is utilized to achieve in-
network false data filtering at cluster nodes and the H-MAC
algorithm is employed to achieve data integrity at the base
station. They claim that their protocol can resist some well-
known cryptographic attacks, such as Known-Ciphertext at-
tack, Known-Plaintext attack, the Sybil attack, Node Capture
attack, and so on. However, we find that this protocol cannot
achieve the security level they claimed. Also, this scheme
cannot resist replay attacks.
Recently, Boudia et al. [4] proposed a novel secure aggre-
gation schemewhich uses Stateful PublicKeyCryptography
(StPKE), symmetric based homomorphic technique and
MAC to provide end-to-end security. However, to achieve
data integrity protection, the messages require to be formed
as concatenations of all messages from member nodes, i.e.
m =m1∣∣… ∣∣mn. Thus, the size of the resulting messages
grows linearly with the number of member nodes or cluster
heads. Therefore, their recoverable sensing data approach is
very inefficient if the message size is large.
Unlike these above schemes using symmetric homomor-
phic encryption, the authors in [18] study the suitability of a
group of asymmetric based homomorphic encryption algo-
rithms and make a detailed analysis of performance in terms
of encryption, decryption and bandwidth. The authors show
that EC-EG algorithm is the best candidate. However, if the
aggregated result is not small enough, EC-EG requires signif-
icantly more computation power for the decryption than other
schemes. It may be that, the plaintext m cannot be recovered
from mP because of the hardness of the ECDLP. The authors
also state that OU is the best scheme if EC-EG cannot be
applied, e.g., in very large networks.
The authors of [5] proposed two recoverable CDA
schemes, RCDA-HOMO for homogeneous WSNs and
RCDA-HETE for heterogeneous WSNs, in which the base
station not only can recover each sensing data, but also can
check the integrity of each original data. However, to verify
the validity of signatures, the base station needs pairing com-
putation. It is well known that the pairing operation is very
expensive. In addition, decryption of a ciphertext is equal to
solution of the ECDLP, which brings much heavier computa-
tion overhead due to the hardness of the ECDLP. Although the
base station is powerful, it is much too heavy, which leads to
very low efficiency in verification. Also, the authors in [7]
point out that RCDA-HETE cannot provide data integrity like
their claim. Moreover, these two schemes do not provide au-
thorized aggregation.
In [6], the authors proposed a CDAMA scheme for multi-
application environments, in which ciphertexts from different
applications can be aggregated into a single one and the base
station can extract application-specific data from aggregated
ciphertexts by a corresponding key. Unfortunately, this
scheme is not suitable for the WSNs where the number of
clusters or applications is large. What is more, it does not
achieve data integrity protection.
Recently, Shim et al. [7] proposed a data aggregation
scheme with end-to-end confidentiality and integrity using
an EC-EG homomorphic scheme and a signature scheme,
which also provides in-network data filtering and authorized
aggregation, but incurs high energy consumption. Also, de-
cryption involves solving the ECDLP, which will undoubtedly
decrease the decryption efficiency.
The aforementioned asymmetric homomorphic
encryption-based schemes are not suitable for the large-scale
WSN. The use of the EC-EG homomorphic encryption algo-
rithm makes it difficult that for the base station to decrypt the
aggregated ciphertexts and obtain the sensing data. If the ag-
gregated results are large, the base station has no way to gain
the original data due to the hardness of ECDLP. Also, these
schemes incur a considerable overhead in terms of energy
consumption and delay due to the cryptographic algorithms
employed.
Our contribution is motivated by the above facts that the
existing secure data aggregation schemes based on symmetric
or asymmetric homomorphic encryption are unsuitable for the
large-scale WSNs, which also justifies the importance of this
work.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly introduce some algorithms men-
tioned and other related cryptographic tools.
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3.1 Okamoto-Uchiyama (OU) algorithm
The Okamoto-Uchiyama (OU) algorithm [19] is a public-key
cryptosystem as secure as factoring and based on the ability of
computing discrete logarithms in a particular subgroup [18].
Detailed descriptions are presented in Fig. 1.
3.2 Elliptic curve ElGamal (EC-EG) algorithm
EC-EG is additively homomorphic and ciphertexts are com-
bined through addition. Its security is based on the ECDLP.
This algorithm is to map plaintext m to the EC point mG, and
reverse m from mG. However, the demapping of the mG back
tom is impractical. Since it is very hard to be inverted for point
multiplication of ECC, the only solution is a brute force com-
putation that relies on a limited domain of the mapping [7, 18].
Detail descriptions are shown in Fig. 2.
3.3 Homomorphic MAC scheme
In 2009, a homomorphic MAC algorithm was proposed by
Agrawal et al. to check the integrity of aggregated data.
Previous MAC cannot achieve the additive property:
MAC(a + b) ≠MAC(a) +MAC(b), so it cannot be directly used
for data aggregation. Fortunately, the homomorphic MAC
scheme makes it possible to ensure the addition over authen-
ticated data and, thus, can be used to verify the integrity of
aggregated data. The correctness and security proof of this
algorithm can be found in [20]. Fig. 3. gives detailed descrip-
tions of the homomorphic MAC.
3.4 Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
The HMAC is generally used to check data integrity and
source. It is implemented by combining a secret key with a
one-way, collision-resistant hash function, such as MD5,
SHA-1 and so on. The security strength of HMAC is due to
the underlying hash function. We use HMAC (k, m) to repre-
sent digest of m with a key k.
4 Comments on BConfidentiality and integrity
for data aggregation in WSN using homomorphic
encryption^
In secure data aggregation schemes, homomorphic en-
cryption is usually used to protect data confidentiality.
The authors of [18, 21] analyze security and performance
for several common asymmetric homomorphic encryp-
tion schemes, including EC-NS, EC-OU, EC-P, EC-EG
and OU. Recently, Othman et al. [8] proposed a data
aggregation scheme with confidentiality and integrity in
WSN using homomorphic encryption, in which the au-
thors adopt OU to protect data confidentiality; however,
EC-EG instead of OU is used as homomorphic encryp-
tion for this paper in Aggregate Phase and Verify Phase.
The processes for Aggregate Phase and Verify Phase are
the same as [5]. The review of Othman et al.’s data
aggregation scheme is presented in Fig. 4.
From ①② in Fig. 4, we can see that the authors intend
to employ OU homomorphic encryption algorithm to pro-
tect data privacy. However, we can see that r; sð Þ in
Aggregated Phase and rmap() in Verify Phase do not ap-
pear in Encrypt-Sign Phase from ③④, because they be-
long to the EC-EG homomorphic encryption algorithm
rather than OU.
So, we correct Othman et al.’s data aggregation scheme as
follows:
Setup Phase. The base station generates parameters
{n,g,h,p,q} and then publishes parameters {n,g,h} as its
public key. These system parameters are preloaded on
each sensor node. {p,q}are kept only by the base station
and used as its private key.
Encrypt-Sign Phase.
1. Encoding: mi = di∣∣0β,where β = l ⋅ (i − 1), di is the sens-
ing data by the node i.
2. Sign: σi ¼ hixi ,where hi =ℋ(di).
3. Encrypt: ci ¼ gmiþnri .
Fig. 1 The Okamoto-Uchiyama
(OU) algorithm
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Aggregation Phase.
1. Aggregating Ciphertext:
c ̂ ¼ ∏η−1i¼1gmiþnri ¼ g∑
η−1
i¼1miþnri ¼ g∑η−1i¼1mi .
2. Aggregating Signature: σ î ¼ ∑η−1i¼1σi.
Verify Phase.
1. Decrypt:
c
0 ¼ c ̂p−1mod p2 ¼ g∑η−1i¼1mi ⋅ p−1ð Þmod p2 ¼ gp∑
η−1
i¼1mi ,
m
0 ¼ ∑η−1i¼1mi ¼ L c
0 
L gp
 −1
.
2. Decoding: di =m
'[(i − 1) ⋅ l, i ⋅ l − 1] , i = 1 , 2 , … , η − 1.
3. Verify: e g1;σ ̂ð Þ ¼ ∏η−1i¼1e vi; hið Þ.
5 Comments on BSymmetric-key based
homomorphic primitives for end-to-end secure data
aggregation in wireless sensor networks^
Recently, Parmar et al. [9] proposed an integrity and privacy
preserving end-to-end secure data aggregation protocol, in
which a symmetric homomorphic encryption algorithm is
used to protect data confidentiality and a homomorphic
MAC algorithm is employed to achieve data integrity. They
claim that their protocol can resist some well-known crypto-
graphic attacks, such as Known-Plaintext attack, Node
Capture attack, and so on. However, we found that this proto-
col cannot achieve the security level they claimed.
5.1 The weakness found
In this scheme, all the leaf nodes use the same symmetric key
to generate a homomorphic MAC tag. What is more, the
Fig. 3 The Homomorphic MAC
scheme
Fig. 2 The Elliptic Curve
ElGamal (EC-EG) algorithm
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homomorphicMAC tag is generated over a plaintextm, which
leads to security weakness. Once a node is compromised,
messages of all the nodes are revealed and, thus, an adversary
can forge the aggregated results to deceive the base station. As
such, this protocol cannot provide security against Known-
Plaintext attack or, Node Capture attack. The analysis is as
follows.
(1) Known-Plaintext Attack. In such attack, an adversary
tries to deduce the key or recover other plaintexts from
their own ciphertexts by some plaintext-ciphertext
pairs. In WSN, sensor nodes are easily compromised
due to the hostile and unattended environment thus, a
compromised node may produce such plaintext-
ciphertext pairs. In [9], the authors state that the key
for each node is only shared with the base station and
other nodes cannot access it, so, even though a node is
compromised and its key is revealed, an adversary has
no way to gain other nodes’ information through it and
thus can resist Known-Plaintext Attack. However, as
all the leaf nodes use the same key to encrypt the
plaintext, if a node is compromised, the messages of
all the nodes will be discovered. Therefore, this proto-
col cannot resist such attack.
(2) Node Capture attack. If a node is captured, sensor read-
ings and its key information stored will be discovered. In
this scheme, the authors state that they use a symmetric
homomorphic encryption for privacy protection, and any
captured sensor node can only reveal its own sensor
readings, but cannot decrypted the ciphertexts encrypted
with other sensor nodes’ encryption keys. Although the
adversary cannot directly decrypt ciphertexts to obtain
other nodes’ plaintexts, he can decrypt homomorphic
MAC tags with the same k’ to gain sensor readings of
other nodes. Hence, the protocol cannot protect the net-
work against node capture attacks.
Apart from the above weaknesses identified in the protocol,
we also found that the protocol cannot resist replay attack. In
addition, the intermediate nodes need to store key information
of their child nodes, which make them especially attractive for
adversaries. Therefore, to guarantee security, the intermediate
nodes are best equipped with a tamper-resistant device. In
addition, if the number of child nodes is large, the storage
space for normal nodes is insufficient. What is more, the in-
termediate nodes not only encrypt messages and generate
MAC and homomorphic MAC tag like their child nodes, but
also verify each message received, which results in more en-
ergy consumed than their child nodes and causes an energy
imbalance between the intermediate nodes and child nodes.
Hence, the intermediate nodes can be considered setting as
high-end nodes.
Fig. 4 The review of Othman
et al.’s data aggregation scheme
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6 System model
In this section, we state two models: network model and
adversary model. The network model defines the network
architecture; the adversary model defines common attacks
against which a secure data aggregation scheme should
protect.
6.1 Network model
In our scheme, the network topology is a cluster-based ag-
gregation structure and each cluster possesses a cluster head
(CH) (see Fig.5). AWSN contains large numbers of sensor
nodes and one base station. Since storing keys share with
their member nodes and verify packets received, this makes
them require more storage space and higher computational
capability than member nodes, and thus, CHs are set to be
powerful high-end sensors while member nodes are low-
end nodes. We suppose that each node has a unique identi-
fier (ID) and can be identified by their IDs. After deploy-
ment, all nodes are stationary and the base station (BS) is
fixed. We assume that the BS is powerful and absolutely
t rus ted . F ina l ly, t ime is assumed to be loose ly
synchronized.
6.2 Adversary model
We categorize the adversary’s abilities as follows:
1) An adversary can obtain secret information by passively
eavesdropping data being transmitted.
2) An adversary can interfere with the communication by
replaying old packets, modifying the transmitted data,
injecting false data or unauthorized aggregation.
3) An adversary can physically compromise a sensor node
or a CH.
Next, we further refine these three kinds of attacks into
three categories based on abilities and purposes of adversaries.
In category A, an adversary is aimed at obtaining secret
information.
A1: Eavesdropping attack. Eavesdropping attack con-
cerns the passive adversary aiming to get information.
In category B, an adversary aims to send false data by
modifying the contents, replaying old packets, injecting bogus
data or unauthorized aggregation to deceive the base station
even though he does not have the secret key.
B1: Malleability. Malleability allows an adversary to
modify data without knowing the content.
B2: Replay attack. An adversary intercepts the transmit-
ted data, and then replays it in the future to deceive the
BS.
B3: Injection attack. An adversary can generate
valid ciphertexts under the public key of the base
station and then inject them into the network to
deceive the base station and waste the transmission
energy.
B4: Unauthorized aggregation. The idea of such an at-
tack is to aggregate two or more proper ciphertexts into a
forged, but authentically looking one in order to cheat the
base station.
In category C, an adversary is aimed at the sensing data or
secret keys, for example, keys for generating MAC and H-
MAC.
C1: Compromise attack. An adversary can compromise a
CH or a sensor node to try to obtain the sensing data.
7 The proposed scheme
Our secure data aggregation is composed of four phases:
Setup, Encrypt, Aggregate, Verify. The Setup phase is to
prepare and preload some essential secrets and system pa-
rameters for each sensor node and the BS. When a node
wants to send its sensing data to its CH, it firstly carries
out Encrypt, and then sends the result to its CH. Unlike
other secure data aggregation schemes in which CH is only
responsible for aggregation, in our scheme, each CH needs
to verify all packets received from its member nodes, which
can filter part of the bogus packets in-network and thus can
save energy in transmission in Aggregate phase. The last
phase is Verify. The BS individually verifies the integrity ofFig. 5 The network model
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the aggregated result for each cluster. Only the aggregated
results passing integrity verification will be decrypted by
the BS and have chance to participate in the final aggrega-
tion. Table 1 lists the notions used later.
[Setup]. Before the deployment of theWSN, the base station
produces necessary secrets and system parameters as follows:
– The base station distributes a cluster identifier CIDjto
each node in cluster j; namely, the cluster identifiers of
nodes in the same cluster are identical.
– The base station chooses an identifier IDi ∈ [1, … , n]for
each node in WSN and preloads them into nodes. For
simplicity, we assume that IDi = i.
– The base station shares a unique symmetric-key pair
kj = {kj1, kj2}with all nodes in the same cluster j, where
symmetric-key pair kj = {kj1, kj2}is used to generate H-
MAC to protect end-to-end data integrity.
– The cluster head CHjshares a symmetric-key ki − jwith its
each member nodes in cluster j and each cluster head CHj
also shares a symmetric-key kj − BS with the base station,
where ki − j and kj − BS are used to produceMAC to achieve
in-network false data filtering.
– The base station generates its public key (n, g, h)
and private key (p, q) according to OU algorithm,
then keeps the private key and publishes its public
key.
[Encrypt-Sign]. When a sensor nodeCMij(i = 1, … , η − 1)
wants to send sensing data mij to its cluster CHj, it needs to
compute:
– Ciphertext. A member node CMijpicks a random number
r∈Rℤn and computes its ciphertext cij ¼ gmijhrijmodn un-
der the public key of the base station through OU
algorithm.
– Homomorphic MAC. In our scheme, the homomorphic
MACHij is generated over the ciphertext instead of plain-
text, which solves the problem that once a member node
in one cluster is compromised, all the member nodes’ data
will be disclosed because the keys used to generate ho-
momorphic MAC for each node in one cluster are
identical.
– MAC. We use MAC to achieve in-network false data fil-
tering, which thus avoids consuming unnecessary trans-
mission energy to transmit false data packets. Timestamp
t is employed to guarantee data freshness. Algorithm 1
presents this process.
[Aggregate].When the cluster head CHj receives (cij ,Hij ,
MACij , tij) from its member nodeCMij(i = 1, … , η − 1), it will
perform the following operations:
– Check timestamps. The CHjchecks the validity of the
timestamp tij. If the timestamp tij is valid, the CHj will
verify MAC. If not, reject it.
Table 1 Notations and their description
Notation Description
CIDj Cluster identifier of sensor nodes belonging to cluster j
η Number of sensor nodes per cluster
mij Sensing data of member node CMij
Hij The homomorphic MAC generated by CMij
nc Number of clusters in the whole network
CHj The cluster head node of the jth cluster in the network
CMij The ith member node in the jth cluster
magg The sum of all valid sensing data
Peer-to-Peer Netw. Appl.
– Verify MAC. The CHj computes HMAC(ki − j, cij| |Hij| | tij)
and compares it with MACij received. If they are equal,
then the CHj aggregates the corresponding ciphertext and
homomorphic MAC, or the packet will be rejected.
– Aggregate. In this step, the cluster headCHj(j = 1, … , nc)
acts as a data aggregator. The CHj aggregates η − 1 ci-
phertexts received from its member nodes and its own
ciphertext into a single ciphertext cj. Also, it combines
η − 1 homomorphic MAC Hij and its own Hij into one
homomorphic MAC Hj. Then, the CHj sends the output
of Algorithm 2 to the base station or the nearest CH.
When a CH receives a packet from another CH, it only
forwards it to the base station, and does not aggregate or
verify it.
[Verify].When the base station receives (cj,Hj,MACj, tj), it
will perform the following operations:
– Check timestamps. The base station checks the
validity of the timestamp tj. If the timestamp tj
is valid, the base station will verify MAC. If
not, reject it.
– Verify MAC. The base station calculates HMAC(kj − BS,
cj| |Hj| | tj) and compares it with MACj received. If they
are equal, it can be sure that the ciphertext received and
the corresponding homomorphic MAC are not modified
by adversaries.
– End-to-end integrity verification. The base station
verifies the integrity of each cj through the homo-
morphic MAC scheme. If the verification holds,
then the aggregated ciphertext cj will be decrypted
and has chance to participate in the final aggrega-
tion, otherwise it will be rejected. In our scheme,
the packet of each cluster is verified individually;
that is to say, after each cluster’s packet is verified
successfully, the base station then decrypts them
and aggregates all valid plaintext mj rather than di-
rectly verifying the final aggregated results. In this
way, if the verification is failed to pass for one
cluster, only the packet of this cluster is discarded.
Unlike other schemes [4, 7], once the verification
fails, all packets, including valid packets, will be
abandoned, which means all data need to be
retransmitted.
– Decrypt. In this step, the base station decrypts the
aggregated ciphertext cj and obtains the aggregated
plaintext mj for each cluster. For those ciphertexts
failed to pass end-to-end integrity verification, it is
not necessary to decrypt them, which results in sav-
ing energy consumption, because, for a modified
packet, verification then decryption only involves
verification overhead while decryption then verifica-
tion consumes energy in both verification and
decryption.
– Get the final aggregated result magg. Only by pass-
ing the end-to-end integrity verification, can the
aggregated plaintext mj participate in the final ag-
gregation; namely, magg is the result of the sum for
all mj whose ciphertext passes the end-to-end integ-
rity verification. Its advantage being that, if some
received messages are not successfully verified,
other valid packets can be utilized. Algorithm 3
describes the detail verification process.
Peer-to-Peer Netw. Appl.
8 Security analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of our scheme in terms
of data confidentiality and integrity.
Theorem 1 Our scheme provides end-to-end data confidenti-
ality in the presence of the adversary of category A.
Proof Since the sensing data of each sensor node are
encrypted with the public key of the base station, only the
corresponding private key can decrypt the encrypted mes-
sages. However, the private key is only stored in the base
station, so, even though an adversary of category A eaves-
drops on the transmitted packet, he cannot decrypt the cipher-
texts. In the following, we analyze how our scheme is secure
against attacks launched by an adversary of category A.
Eavesdrop attack: In our scheme, the sensing data are
encrypted under the public key of the base station during
the transmission process. After receiving packets from its
member nodes, a CH does not decrypt messages but only
aggregates them. Only the base station can decrypt mes-
sages to obtain the sensing data. Even though an adver-
sary eavesdrops on a transmitted packet, he has no way to
decrypt the ciphertext without the private key of the base
station. End-to-end confidentiality of our scheme can be
reduced to the security of the underlying homomorphic
encryption scheme, OU. Detailed security proof can be
found in [19].
Theorem 2 Our scheme provides end-to-end data integrity in
the presence of an adversary of category B.
Proof We utilize a homomorphic MAC scheme to solve the
adversary of category B problem; if malicious behavior
against data integrity occurs, the end-to-end integrity verifica-
tion will not be successful. The security proof for the homo-
morphic MAC can be found in refer to [20]. In the following,
we analyze how our scheme is secure against attacks launched
by an adversary of category B.
Malleability: Malleability is a common threat for all ho-
momorphic encryption schemes. An adversary can alter a
ciphertext by injecting false data, but it will not be detect-
ed due to the homomorphic property. For example, (m +
k) mod n may be modified to (m + x) + kmod n, where x
is the false data injected by an adversary. In our scheme,
we use a homomorphic MAC scheme to verify the integ-
rity of the data. If the encrypted data is tampered, the
integrity verification will fail and thus the BS will refuse
the received packet.
Replay attack: An adversary can impersonate any node
through replaying old packets recorded from past com-
munications; therefore, we add current timestamps to
messages being signed to resist replay attacks. Thus, the
receivers can ensure data freshness by checking the va-
lidity of the timestamps.
Injection attack: With public key cryptography, any ad-
versary can generate a reasonable ciphertext and inject it
into the network to deceive the base station. In our
scheme, each sender (a sensor node or a CH) computes
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a MAC using the symmetric key shared with the receiver
(a CH or the base station), so the receiver will reject these
injected packets in the BVerify MAC^ step if an adversary
injects its false data.
Unauthorized aggregation: Unauthorized aggregation is
a very specific weakness of homomorphic encryption
schemes [18]. The idea of such an attack is to aggregate
two or more proper ciphertexts into a forged but format-
valid ciphertext to deceive the BS. If the CHs only aggre-
gate data, anyone can impersonate this to produce a false
aggregated result by dropping some packets and, thus,
misleading the BS. To protect a homomorphic encryption
scheme from unauthorized aggregation, in our scheme,
each CH not only performs aggregation operation, but
also generates MAC and homomorphic MAC on the ag-
gregated result. Therefore, the BS can check the authen-
ticity of the CHs and the integrity of the aggregated
results.
Theorem 3 Our scheme can provide security against an ad-
versary of category C.
Proof We employ a homomorphic MAC scheme to provide
end-to-end confidentiality. The CHs are only responsible for
aggregation rather than decryption. Therefore, even if a CH is
compromised, an adversary cannot obtain the sensing data. In
addition, we compute a homomorphic MAC over ciphertext
instead of plaintext and, for different clusters, the keys used to
generate a homomorphic MAC are different; therefore, even if
a sensor node is compromised, only its data will be disclosed,
the data for other nodes will be still secure.
Compromise attack: We classify compromise attack into
two cases: (1) Compromise a CH. Since the CHs store
important data, it makes them likely to be targeted by
adversaries. However, even if a CH is compromised, an
adversary cannot obtain the sensing data, because the
CHs do not store the private key of the base station, and
decrypting a ciphertext is impractical. (2) Compromise a
sensor node. If a sensor node is compromised, it only
reveals its own sensing data and an adversary has no
way to get key and data for other nodes. In [9], once an
adversary gains the key used to generate the homomor-
phic MAC by compromising a node, all nodes’ data will
be disclosed, since they calculate the homomorphicMAC
over the plaintext and the keys used for the homomorphic
MAC are identical for all sensor nodes. However, we
compute a homomorphic MAC over the ciphertext and
the keys used to produce a homomorphic MAC for dif-
ferent clusters are different. In this way, even if a node is
compromised, the result cannot have a significant impact
upon the overall system security.
9 Performance analysis
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our scheme in
terms of cost evaluation and execution time (or Bdelay^). Cost
evaluation involves computation overhead, communication
overhead and energy consumption. Delay includes processing
delay, aggregation delay and decryption delay. We also pro-
vide a quantitative analysis of the proposed scheme compared
to RCDA [5], CDAMA [6] and, Sen-SDA [7]. The reason
why we choose these three works for comparison is because
they provide a comparable security level (end-to-end confi-
dentiality and integrity) to ours. Symmetric key-based data
aggregation schemes are not considered, since symmetric
schemes are generally more efficient, but less secure than
asymmetric ones [6].
9.1 Security requirements
A 112-bits security level should be adopted to guarantee ade-
quate security according to [22], but security requirements in
WSNs are generally relaxed to satisfy efficiency constraints.
For example, [23] has adopted a 64-bit security level. We
employ a more conservative solution and use an 80-bit secu-
rity level (RSA-1024 and ECC-160 equivalent). In addition,
for the implementation of the other three works, the elliptic
curve we employ is an MNT curve over with embedding de-
gree of 6, as recommended in [24] for 80-bit security level.
9.2 Cost evaluation
9.2.1 Computation overhead
The implementation is done on Tmote Sky and iMote2 motes
[24]. The iMmote2 mote is equipped with a 32-bit ARM
XScale PXA27x microcontroller and the Tmote Sky mote
uses a 16-bit Texas Instruments MSP430 microcontroller.
On Tmote Sky, the current draw is 21.8mA in receiving mode
and 19.5mA in transmitting mode according to [25]. In
iMote2, according to [26], the current draw is 66mA in
receiving/transmitting mode at 104 MHz. The iMote2 plat-
form takes about 139 ms to execute a scalar multiplication
operation when working at 104 MHz while, according to
[24], Tmote Sky takes 4.1 s. We will use their experimental
results to estimate the energy consumption. In our scheme, we
choose iMote2 as CHs and Tmote Sky as member nodes.
To analyze the computation overhead, we denote symbols
SM and, E as the cost of one scalar multiplication and, a
modular exponentiation, respectively. Other cryptographic
operations, such as hash operations and modular addition are
not considered, since the cost of these operations is negligible
compared to SM and E. In Encrypt phase, a member node has
to compute its ciphertext, H-MAC and MAC, which requires
1E (gmhr = gm + nr, where h = gn mod n,)operation. In
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aggregation phase, a CH verifies the packets received and
then aggregates ciphertexts and H-MACs received from its
member nodes. The process does not involve energy-
consuming operations, just hash, modular additive and con-
catenation operations.
In an RCDA-HOMO scheme, a member node needs to
compute four SMs, of which one SM is required for signature
generation and three SMs for ciphertext generation. A cluster
head only performs point addition operation.
In a CDAMA scheme, the number of SMs that a member
node needs to compute linearly increases with the number of
clusters. If there are two clusters, then four SMs are required.
Similarly, if the number of cluster is n, 2n SMs are needed to
be calculated.
In a Sen-SDA scheme, a member node in one cluster needs
to calculate a ciphertext and generate a signature correspond-
ing to the ciphertext in the Encrypt-Sign phase, which requires
four SMs (hash, module additive and other low-overhead op-
erations are neglected). A cluster head needs 2 N + 1 SMs to
verify signatures from its N member nodes and one SM to
generate the signature of the aggregate result. The comparison
of computation overhead is shown in Table 2.
From Table 2, we can find that our scheme is the best in
terms of computation overhead. In the aggregation phase, the
CH needs to compute 2 N + 2 SMs in order to achieve in-
network false data filtering for a Sen-SDA scheme. However,
only several simple operations are involved in the proposed
scheme, which also provides in-network false data filtering by
MAC verification.
9.2.2 Communication overhead
Firstly, to achieve a fair comparison, we unify the value of
each common parameter. A point on an elliptic curve can be
denoted by coordinates (x, y) in a finite field Fp, with |p| = 163
bits. One can gain y by computing a square root if x and one bit
of y are both given. Therefore, the communication cost of
sending a point is 164 bits. In addition, both sensor nodes’
identities and timestamps are set to be 32 bits.
In our scheme, the ciphertext, MAC, H-MAC and
timestamp need to be transmitted in the WSN. According to
[18], a ciphertext generated by the OU algorithm is 1024 bits.
Here, we consider a 4-byte MAC and H-MAC for calculation
in accordance with [27], the authors of which have validated
the security of 4-byte MAC for WSNs scenarios. The
timestamp is also 4 bytes. Therefore, the size of one transmit-
ted packet in our scheme is 1120 bits.
In an RCDA-HOMO scheme, the transmitted message
contains ciphertext ci and the corresponding signature σi.
The size of the message is 482 bits, which contains two curve
points (164*2 = 328 bits) and one BON [28] signature (154
bits).
In a CDAMA scheme, the size of ciphertexts is (k + 1) ∗
256 + 1 bits according to [6], where k is the number of clus-
ters. If k = 3, then the total length of a transmitted message is
1024 bits.
In a Sen-SDA scheme, a transmitted message includes
sender’s ID, receiver’s ID, ciphertext C, signature σ and
timestamp tt. The length of the ciphertext C = <C1 ,C2> con-
taining two points of the elliptic curve is 328 bits. The signa-
ture σi = < Ri , Ti , zi> consists of two points of the elliptic
curve and one number in ℤq, so its length is 488 bits. Two
IDs are 64 bits and timestamp is 32 bits. Therefore, the total
length of one message sent by the sensor node is 912 bits.
Table 3 shows the comparison of communication overhead.
From Table 3, we can see that our scheme is not the best in
communication cost. This is because the security of the pro-
posed scheme is based on the hardness of the integer factori-
zation problem and the curve has to be chosen from a large
field, resulting in higher encryption overhead [6]. Other
schemes benefit from their smaller modulus operations in both
ciphertext size and computation efforts, since their security is
based on the hardness of ECDLP.
However, although our scheme is relatively inefficient in
terms of communication cost, the proposed scheme achieves
in-network false data filtering and is very helpful to save en-
ergy. As all these above data aggregation schemes use homo-
morphic encryption schemes based on asymmetric cryptogra-
phy to protect data confidentiality, anyone can generate valid
ciphertexts. If there appears large numbers of these false
packets, much energy will be wasted to transmit them.
Table 2 Comparison of computation overhead on member node and
CH
Encrypt (CMij) Aggregate(CHj)
RCDA-HOMO 4 SM --
CDAMA (k = 2) 4 SM --
CDAMA (k = 3) 6 SM --
CDAMA (k = 4) 8 SM --
Sen-SDA 4 SM 2 N + 2 SM
Our scheme 1 E --
k: the number of clusters in the whole network
N: the number of member nodes in one cluster
Table 3 Comparison of communication overhead
Communication (bits)
RCDA-HOMO 482
CDAMA (k = 2) 769
CDAMA (k = 3) 1025
CDAMA (k = 4) 1281
Sen-SDA 912
Our scheme 1120
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Fortunately, our scheme can filter these bogus packets en-
route and, thus, avoid consuming unnecessary energy due to
transmitting them. Also, in our scheme, the packet of each
cluster is verified individually. In this way, if the verification
fails to pass for one cluster, only the packet of this cluster is
discarded. Unlike other schemes, once the verification fails,
all packets, including valid packets, will be abandoned, which
means all data need to be retransmitted. To some extent, our
scheme can greatly save communication overhead in the case
event that one or more false packets reach to the base station.
In a practical application, this case is very likely to emerge.
9.2.3 Energy consumption
Energy consumption (EC) is the core issue in WSNs.
Communication and computation are two main factors that
affect energy consumption.
– ECs for computation. We can estimate ECs of each phase
utilizing the formulaW =U × I × t, whereU is the voltage,
I is the current draw, and t is the execution time for one
phase. According to [19], we find that a modular expo-
nentiation operation takes 7k/4 modular multiplications in
the extended binarymethod and the encryption process of
OU requires about 230 modular multiplications.
Additionally, the time required to compute binary field
multiplication at the 80-bit security level on Tmote Sky
platform is 8706 cycles according to [29]. Since a pairing
computation takes 10.4 × 106 cycles and the time con-
sumed is 1.27 s, we can estimate the cost of a multiplica-
tion in the binary field as
1:27s
10:4 106cycles  8706cycles ¼ 1:06ms:
A multiplication in the extended field is about six times
that in the binary filed. Therefore, computing a modular
exponentiation operation in the extended field takes about
1.06ms × 6 × 230 = 1.46s. The Encrypt phase in our
scheme requires a modular exponentiation operation
(Note that we neglect the cost of other operations such as
hash, modular additive and so on, because they are much
smaller compared to modular exponentiation) and thus the
resulting ECs is Wc = 3V × 1.8mA × 1.46s = 7.88mJ, where
3 V is the voltage and 1.8 mA is the current draw for the
Tmote Sky mote.
– ECs for communication. The ECs for receiving and trans-
mitting an l-bits message are Wr =U ∗ Ir ∗ l/dr, and Wt =
U ∗ It ∗ l/dr, respectively, where Ir and It are the current
draw in receiving and transmitting mode, respectively,
and dr (dr = 250kbps) is a data rate. Therefore, ECs for
the reception and transmission of one message on Tmote
Sky are Wr = 3 ∗ 21.8 ∗ 1120/250 , 000 = 0.29 mJ and
Wt = 3 ∗ 19.5 ∗ 1120/250 , 000 = 0.26 mJ, respectively.
In our scheme, a member node transmits the data to its
cluster head once only, so the total EC of one member
node for communication is Wt = 0.26 mJ. The ECs for a
member node are provided in Table 4. For CHs, apart
from a Sen-SDA scheme, the CHs in other schemes only
execute several simple operations and consume much
smaller energy, which can be ignored, so we will not
make a detailed description of ECs for CHs.
From the comparison results in Table 4, we can find that
our scheme provides a great reduction of energy consumption
compared with related woks and network lifetime can be
hugely improved, which can be explained by the fact that
much less computation cost is incurred in our scheme due to
the use of OU homomorphic encryption algorithm.
9.3 Delay
We define that processing delay denotes the execution time to
produce the ciphertexts, the corresponding H-MAC andMAC
for member nodes. Aggregation delay is measured by the time
spent on verifying MAC from member nodes, aggregating
ciphertexts and H-MAC, and generating the MAC of the ag-
gregated result. Decryption delay indicates the time spent on
eventually gaining original data for the BS by verifying ag-
gregated H-MAC and decrypting aggregated ciphertexts.
In Table 5, SM, PA, AES, E,ECDLP and P represent a scalar
multiplication, point addition, AES encryption algorithm,
modular exponentiation, the elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem and bilinear pairings, respectively.
From the results in Table 5, we can calculate that the pro-
cessing delay of RCDA-HOMO, CDAMA (k = 4), Sen-SDA,
and our scheme are 16.4 s, 32.8 s, 16.4 s and 1.46 s, respec-
tively. Here, we neglect the cost of PA and H, since they are
much smaller compared to the cost of SM, ECDLP and P. For
Table 4 Energy consumption of a member node on Tmote Sky
EC for
comp. (mJ)
EC for
comm.(mJ)
Total EC (mJ)
RCDA-HOMO 88.56 0.11 88.67
CDAMA(k = 2) 88.56 0.18 88.74
CDAMA(k = 3) 132.84 0.24 133.08
CDAMA(k = 4) 177.12 0.30 177.42
Sen-SDA 88.56 0.21 88.77
Our Scheme 7.88 0.26 8.14
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the aggregation delay, apart from a Sen-SDA scheme, RCDA-
HOMO and CDAMA schemes’ aggregation delay can be
largely ignored because they do not provide in-network false
data filtering and just execute several PA operations. Although
our scheme achieves in-network false data filtering, the aggre-
gation delay is also negligible, because only a few hash oper-
ations are required to compute.
For the decryption delay, our scheme is much smaller than
all the above data aggregation schemes. To gain a more intu-
itive understanding, we take N = 10 and k = 20 as an example.
According to [30], the execution time of SM, P and, H oper-
ations is 0.442 ms, 4.211 ms and 0.0001 ms, respectively.
Table 6 lists the execution time of the above cryptographic
operations running on an Intel I7–4770 processor with
3.40 GHz clock frequency, 4 gigabytes memory and running
Windows 7 operating system. Cryptographic library
MIRACL is used to measure time consumption of these three
cryptographic operations. In fact, it is impractical to solve
ECDLP within current computational capabilities unless the
final aggregationm is small enough. To give an intuitive com-
parison, if we take m as 3 bytes, it would take about 170ms to
decrypt the message [7].
Quantitative comparison of decryption delay is pre-
sented in Table 7. Note that decryption delay indicates
the time spent on decrypting messages of all clusters
instead of one cluster.
From Table 7, we can find that RCDA-HOTO, CDAMA
and, Sen-SDA schemes are much larger than our scheme in
terms of decryption delay. This can be explained by the fact
that these three schemes suffer from expensive mapping func-
tion during decryption, which involves the elliptic curve dis-
crete logarithm problem and is too costly to revert. Although
the BS owns considerably powerful computational capabili-
ties, if computation burden is too heavy, the BS is busy in
decrypting ciphertexts, which makes the whole network easily
paralyzed. Fortunately, our scheme can quickly decrypt ci-
phertexts and get the sensing data, even if the size of the
aggregated result is large. Therefore, our scheme is more suit-
able for larger WSNs.
10 Conclusion
In this paper, we correct some errors and amend the
security flaws found in other data aggregation schemes,
and successfully design an approach to achieve data
integrity protection for the CDAMA scheme. We also
propose a secure data aggregation scheme suitable for
large-scale WSNs, while reducing reduce the energy
consumption. We employ the OU homomorphic encryp-
tion algorithm to protect end-to-end data confidentiality,
use MAC to achieve in-network false data filtering, and
utilize the homomorphic MAC algorithm to achieve
end-to-end data integrity. Unlike other schemes, in this
proposed scheme, the base station can still quickly de-
crypt and obtain the original data even though the ag-
gregation results are large, while other solutions may
not be able to decrypt ciphertexts or the base station
is being busy decoding and thus system may become
paralyzed. In addition, each cluster’s data packet
reaching the base station is individually authenticated
so that if data authentication of one cluster fails, only
the data of the cluster will be discarded. Unlike other
schemes, once the authentication fails, all data including
all of the valid data will be abandoned, namely, all data
need retransmission, which exceedingly wastes the ener-
gy of nodes. Besides, this scheme can greatly weaken
the compromise attack: that a node is compromised will
not threaten secret messages of other nodes in the same
cluster. We choose two popular hardware platforms,
Tmote Sky and iMote 2, to investigate the efficiency
and feasibility of our scheme. The results demonstrate
that our scheme has an excellent performance in
Table 6 Execution time of different cryptographic operations
TSM TP TH
Execution Time (ms) 0.442 4.211 0.0001
Table 5 Comparison of delay in
different phases Processing delay Aggregation delay Decryption delay
RCDA-HOMO 4SM + 1PA + 1H (2N − 2)PA 1ECDLP + k(N + 1)P
CDAMA 2kSM + kPA (k − 1)PA kSM + kECDLP
Sen-SDA 4SM + 1PA + 1H (2N + 2)SM + (2N − 2)PA + 1H (2k + 1)SM + 1ECDLP
Our Scheme 1E + 3H (N + 1)H (2kN + k)H
Table 7 Comparison of decryption delay
RCDA-HOTO CDAMA Sen-SDA Our scheme
Decryption
Delay (ms)
1096.42 3408.84 188.122 0.042
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reducing energy consumption. In addition, delay, espe-
cially decryption delay at the base station is very short
unlike its counterparts, in the event where the base sta-
tion is unable to decrypt ciphertexts and obtain the
sensing data may arise. In the future, we aim to con-
sider new attacks such as selective forwarding.
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